We conduct an experiment in the lab to determine the effect of varying the source of piracy advice on music consumer behavior. By using teenagers and parents in our subject pool, we increase the realism of the piracy context by sampling potential pirates and their parents. Our treatments represent various sources of piracy advice (e.g., the teen's parent, a record label, or an external regulator). Subjects make their decisions playing our new experimental game -The Piracy Game -which is extended from the volunteer's dilemma literature. Interestingly, subjects respond negatively to advice from record labels over time, purchasing fewer songs compared to when the advice is received from other sources such as the subject's parent. The existence of the social tie between the advisor and the subject assists in mitigating piracy, especially when the source of advice is a parent facing potential penalties due to his/her child's behavior. An external regulator, who has no social with the advisee and has no stake in the decision of the advisee, provides the least credible source of advice and leads to the greatest amount of piracy.
Introduction
Digital good manufacturers and related organizations point to significant losses incurred due to digital piracy (e.g., $ 12.5 Billion loss from software piracy IFPI, 2009) . In order to thwart piracy, these organizations are increasingly adopting approaches to educate potential pirates about the implications of piracy and "nudge" them to disengage from pirating. In some approaches, nudging is done through direct channels (i.e., the vendor or the music artist delivers the message via youtube videos or public statements) whereas in other approaches, it is delivered through someone who may have a social tie with the pirate (i.e., teachers and parents). While anecdotally some approaches (e.g., 2DBoy, 2008) have led to favorable behavioral outcomes, it is not ex ante clear how these approaches compare in terms of piracy. Our paper analyzes how the approaches compare not only in terms of limiting piracy but also in terms of enabling purchases. Using these metrics, we answer the following research questions: Does sending informative advice matter in a framed piracy context? Who is the best source of advice? Does it matter if the source of advice has a stake in the outcome of the piracy decision?
We answer these questions using an experimental lab setting and we chose to consider experiments for the following reasons. First, studying the aforementioned questions using secondary data is quite difficult, if not impossible. Second, tracking behavior in illegal contexts (such as piracy) is challenging because participants may explicitly behave differently when they realize they are being tracked. Third, information flows cannot be easily controlled in real scenarios unlike in controlled randomized trials. Therefore, attributing the differences in the outcomes to the policy changes may be tenuous. Fourth, while randomized field trials would be ideal, DMCA (Digital Millenium Copyright Act) and other legal obstacles limit our ability to conduct field experiments.
Our experiment involves a volunteer dilemma game, which models free-riding problems in a context involving public goods or goods that share the characteristics of public goods. A key motivation for considering a public good games is that many economists, including Varian (1998) , treat information goods (e.g., music, movies, software) as public goods. 1 We consider a variant of the volunteer dilemma game that explicitly accounts for subjects' decision to engage in piracy versus purchase the good. This distinction does not exist even in a typical public good game and is a distinctive feature of our game. Moreover, the subject pool we employ for the experiment is unique. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to include parents and their teens in a behavioral economics study. An important consequence of the subject population is that our experimental population is quite similar in age as the real population that we deal with in the piracy context.
Using this experimental setup, we consider four different treatments that vary in terms of the source of advice. These treatments vary along two dimensions -one dimension is whether the source has a social tie with the subjects and the other dimension is whether the source has a stake in the game. Specifically, the four treatments we consider are: (a) Social tie and stake: advice from parents incurring penalties for their respective teens' piracy decisions (reflecting penalties from legal actions); (b) Social tie and no stake: advice from parents without any penalties for their teens' actions; (c) No social tie but stake: advice from the private provisioner of the public good; and (d) No social tie and no stake: advice from a third party regulator not directly affected because of piracy/purchase decisions. Note that these treatments reflect the typically-used educational approaches quite well. Also, as we will discuss later, to the best of our knowledge, prior work has not addressed the impact of the source of the advice along these two dimensions.
The following are some of the salient results from our analyses. As expected, subjects seem to exhibit non-standard preferences. We also observe differences in the outcomes among treatments.
Specifically, when the source of advice is a parent (i.e., a social tie exists), a decreased amount of pirating is observed compared to when the advisor is an unrelated third party (e.g., a record label or regulator). The most effective treatment in reducing pirating and increasing purchasing is when the source of advice is the parent who is being punished for their teens' pirating actions. Surprisingly, the record label as the source of advice results in the lowest purchasing levels as compared to the other treatments. Lastly, the third party regulator -which does not have a social tie or a stake in the outcome -is the least effective source of advice at influencing pirating. Based on our results, we provide insights about effective approaches for disseminating advice about piracy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature in Section 2, and introduce the piracy game in Section 3. The treatment design, parameters, and hypotheses are described in Section 4, followed by our experimental implementation in Section 5. Results are provided in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7.
Related Literature
Our paper primarily relates to three main research streams: experiments on advice, social ties in experiments, and literature on piracy. 2 Each subsection below considers each of the streams.
Experimental Work on Communication
Advice may be construed as communication and here we survey related work. We first consider public good contexts, where much of the prior work has considered communication amongst contributors to a public good. A few papers have studied how the nature of communication improves 2 Our paper also relates to experiments in public goods, on which there is an extensive literature. It has recognized the dominant strategy of free-riding behavior, heterogeneity in cooperation by subjects, as well as design features in public good games (see Anderson, 1995; Ledyard, 1995; Davis and Holt, 1993, chapter 3) . Various other aspects of the public good game has also been considered. For example, Fehr and Gächter (2000) ; Andreoni et al. (2003) ; Masclet et al. (2003) ; Reuben and Riedl (2009); Nikiforakis (2008) ; Kosfeld and Riedl (2004) study punishment and rewards from a decentralized and exogenously imposed perspective, while Andreoni (1993); Falkinger et al. (2000) ; Croson et al. (2006) ; Kosfeld and Riedl (2004) explore the punishment originating in a centralized manner from the experimenter. Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) ; Charness and Yang (2010) ; Ahn et al. (2010) ; Kosfeld et al. (2009); Sutter et al. (2010) consider group formation as a mechanism to mitigate free-riding. Regarding information feedback, some papers directly explore how past contributions to the public good affect future contributions (Sell and Wilson, 1991; Weimann, 1994; Croson, 2001; Croson and Marks, 1998). coordination. Isaac and Walker (1988) show that face-to-face communication between rounds in a public good game significantly reduces the free-riding problem even though the communication is non-binding, meaning the subjects do not have to implement the results of their communication in their decision. Bochet et al. (2006) find that text-based communication is nearly as efficient as face-to-face at mitigating free-riding. Cason and Khan (1999) show that communication mitigates the free-riding problem, both with and without the ability for the subjects to perfectly or imperfectly monitor the contributions of others to the public good. Kroll et al. (2007) explores the role of voting as a communication mechanism to achieve a majority outcome in a public good game. If votes made by subjects are non-binding, the subjects in their game dismiss the majority opinion as cheap talk. It is however possible to sustain cooperation if a binding mechanism is installed that punishes those that deviate from the group majority. Chaudhuri et al. (2006) finds that advice about how to play the game when provided in a more public fashion (i.e., when made as a common knowledge) results in greater contributions to the public good.
Communication as a means to improve coordination has been studied in other contexts also. In a dictator game, Mohlin and Johannesson (2008) find that allocations increase significantly when the dictator receives communication from the recipient. Similarly, in trust games, Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009) show that prior communication increases trust, resulting in greater cooperation and outcomes in a trust game. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) experimentally explore the impact of communication on cooperation in a trust game, where communication takes the form of passing notes between subjects in different rooms. They find an associated impact on promises made (and kept), measuring the existence of guilt aversion as a type of social preference.
The role of communication has been noted to be different depending on how the sender's incentives are aligned with the receiver's. Crawford and Sobel (1982) is a seminal work in this regard.
They analyze the nature of communication using a Sender-Receiver game, where the sender -who is privy to some information affecting the receiver's outcome -transmits the information. They find that when the interests do not align between the sender and the receiver, the communication is interpreted as cheap talk. In an experimental context, Healy (2009) shows how heterogeneity in source of advice -in this case, nationality -in a sender-receiver game leads to differing outcomes.
Social Ties in Experiments
The experimental literature on the impact of communication on cooperation and coordination, reviewed above, relies on the behavior of anonymous and unrelated individuals that are randomly matched in the laboratory. Subjects' behavior, however, is recognized to depend not only on their intrinsic preferences, but also on the strength of the relationships within which social exchange is embedded (Granovetter, 1973) . As such, a small but growing experimental literature in economics has been considering the impact of social ties. Mostly, this literature focuses on social preferences comparing the choices done by physically and emotionally connected individuals, i.e., those with strong social ties, with those done by strangers whose social ties are weak.
Using a simple bargaining game -the ultimatum game - Polzer et al. (1993) show that friends demand less than strangers to reach an agreement. Hoffman et al. (1996) vary the social distance between the subjects and the experimenter in a dictator game and find out that social distance influences fairness. In particular, they support the hypothesis of a negative correlation between offers and social distance. Glaeser et al. (2000) match subjects at various levels of social ties in a trust game and show that as social ties get stronger there is a shift towards more trusting and trustworthiness. Reuben and van Winden (2008) focus on the effect of social ties on negative reciprocity and find that friends are more likely to punish the proposer for an unkind action. Leider et al. (2009) conduct an online field experiment using a real world social network to disentangle possible explanations of pro-social behavior. They find out that intrinsic altruism towards a stranger, social ties, and the prospect of future interactions all play a role in giving behavior. Remarkably, the directed altruism that favors friends over strangers stranger increases giving by 52% while the prospect of future interaction increases giving by 24%.
Recently, Chakravarty et al. (2012) investigates the effect of social ties in a setting where subject's other-regarding preferences embody a potential lying behavior. They find that subjects are less likely to lie to friends than to strangers. The effect is particularly strong for selfish individuals as pro-social individuals not only lie less in general, but are also equally likely to lie to friends or strangers.
The impact of social ties in diminishing free-riding behavior has also been reported. For instance, Gächter and Fehr (1999) explore whether social approval decreases free-riding in a repeated public good game. Despite finding that social approval alone does not improve cooperation, cooperation is enhanced in cases where subjects familiarize themselves with each other. Also, in an experimental microfinance game, Abbink et al. (2006) observe that acquaintances have a higher willingness to cooperate than strangers at the beginning of the experiment, but they also retaliate more as they are less willing to tolerate free-riding behavior by others.
Despite our focus being on the experimental literature, it is important to stress that the importance of social ties has been incorporated in different economic models. Closer to our context is the model of van Dijk and van Winden (1997) that consider the interplay between the provision of public goods and the formation of social ties. In their model a social tie between two individuals is defined in terms of the extent to which they care about each other's well-being. Experimental work using a public good game indeed confirms that the social tie formation depends on the success of the game (van Dijk et al., 2002) .
Our subject pool not only involved teens but also their parents. We are not aware of any prior work engaging parents in an experimental setting, and that is a unique feature of our game.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to investigate the role of an advisee's social tie with the source of advice when the source may or may not have a stake in the advisee's decision. As mentioned before, the two dimensional analysis on the source of advice builds on Crawford and Sobel (1982) .
Related Piracy Literature
The existing Information Systems (IS) research has focused primarily on behavioral and analytical approaches to study piracy. Early IS work on piracy prioritized the factors most important to pirates (Cheng et al., 1997) . They identify the cost of the digital good as the most important one, followed by the pirates' desire to sample before buying. Many analytical works have focused on the pricing effects of digital goods in pirate versus purchase decisions (Khouja and Park, 2008) .
A few other analytical models explore piracy in conjunction with other strategies implied to limit the implications of piracy. Chellappa and Shivendu (2005) deal with sampling strategies along with pricing. Gopal and Sanders (1997) and Sundararajan (2004) focus on technology deterrence in the context of piracy. Bhattacharjee et al. (2003) , and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009) study how piracy may be limited using bundling strategies along with technology protection. 3 Chellappa and Shivendu (2003) suggest that implementing various global standards is a way to limit losses due to piracy across geographic regions. Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) study piracy in emerging markets by modeling consumer search of digital experience goods, finding retailer profits are maximized in conjunction with some level of piracy. Clemons et al. (2003) explore technology protection in newly vulnerable markets (i.e, exposure to digitization) that can be implemented as a defensive strategy against piracy for recording artists.
From the behavioral perspective of piracy, initial work was rooted in modeling piracy as an ethical decision-decision making process (Thong and Yap, 1998) , illustrating support for norms and perceived consequences influencing ethical judgment and moral intention. Many of the factors identified in their work have been included in follow-up research to suggest strategies to enhance customer retention by addressing intentions to use legal software Peace et al., 2003) . These strategies include pricing, communication, and legal actions, among others, to mitigate piracy (Chiu et al., 2008; Moores and Chang, 2006) . We experimentally test advice as an educational strategy in our paper, moving beyond conjecture in the prior literature. Our approach is especially useful given our experimental treatments that are designed to tease apart implications based upon the source of advice.
On the experimental/behavioral economics front, we are only aware of our own work , which examines the effect of information about others' contributions to a public good when the information is targeted to specific subgroups of players in the game. The key findings are that randomly providing information about others' contribution has a negative effect on behavior, and that targeting the same information to those contributing above the average leads to the highest amount of coordination.
Overall, the ability to address the gaps discussed in the prior literature, with the strong parallel between piracy and free-riding in public goods, presents an appropriate foundation for the development and introduction of our piracy game.
The Game and Theoretical Predictions
Our game -the piracy game -considers n music consumers and a record label. In the game only the consumers make a decision although the record label receives the proceeds generated by consumers'
decisions. The stylized model represents a situation in which each consumer attempts to free ride on the behavior of other members in a dynamic setting. Next we present the details of our piracy game followed by the equilibrium analysis.
The Piracy Game
We consider a group of n symmetric, risk-neutral consumers that make M decisions during a finite period of time. In particular, at each decision node, consumers decide independently and anonymously whether to buy a song from a record label, whether to download a song, or do nothing. After the decision is submitted, the consumer is again required to choose between one of the three actions. Consumers make the same decision repeatedly until time T ends.
Each consumer has a private endowment of e > 0 that can be used to buy songs from the record label during the amount of time T . The record label is endowed with S number of songs. The price of each song is normalized to one. Songs are assumed to have a characteristic of a public good, and once bought they are readily available for others to download/pirate. Consumers in our game do not have the ability to restrict other consumers from downloading their purchased songs. However, each consumer can decide whether or not (s)he downloads for free (i.e. pirate) a song purchased by one of the other consumers. Besides the initial endowment e, each consumer is also endowed with b number of songs. These initial endowment in songs cannot be sold but these endowed songs is available for other consumers to pirate. Endowing each music consumer with songs allows the other consumers the ability to purchase or pirate at the start of each game, rather than constraining the initial decision to always purchasing from the record label. If not all feasible strategies are available to the music consumer, we may be forcing a preference -particularly in an experiment -that could result in path dependency for future decisions.
Denote by α b − 1 and α d the respective net payoffs of buying and downloading/pirating a song at any time t ∈ {1, ..., T }. The payoffs satisfy the following assumptions:
the payoff generated from consuming a purchased song is greater than the payoff generated by consuming a pirated song (for example, a pirated song may be problematic to the consumer due to viruses, poisoned content, etc); (2) α b > 1: the purchasing decision is individually rational for any consumer.; and (3) α d > α b − 1 > 0: a rational consumer will always prefer to pirate songs whenever they are available for download. In case a consumer chooses neither to buy nor to pirate a song, he earns a return of zero for that 'do nothing' decision.
The final payoff at time T for consumer i is:
where b i and d i are the number of songs bought and pirated respectively buy consumer i and u (b) is the utility derived from consuming the initial endowment in songs.
The record label's profits from the consumers' purchases of songs, as well as α l per song left in inventory. In this case, we construe α l as representing the copyright ownership of the song. 4 We impose 1 > α l , implying a record label would always prefer to sell a song to a consumer instead of keeping it in inventory. Thus, the record label profit is
As mentioned earlier, parents of the music consumers are also involved in our game. The parents are endowed with E tokens. When the parent is punished for his/her child's actions, the parent suffers a loss of α p per song pirated by the child. So, teen i's parent earns π
Theoretical Predictions
Note that the presence of parents (with or without punishment) and the record label do not change the equilibrium of a rational self-interested music consumer. So, the rest of the theoretical predictions never deals with them. To solve for the subgame perfect equilibria in our game, we use the backward induction approach. Consider the last decision, i.e, the subgame starting at decision node M and assume that consumers have sufficient endowment to buy at least one song. Each consumer faces a volunteer dilemma. 6 Given that the net payoff from buying α b − 1 is smaller than the net payoff from pirating α d the consumer prefers always to pirate instead of buying if at least one of other consumers buys a song, which would then be available for download by others. (Note also that a consumer doing nothing is a dominated strategy in this game and so, the rest of the theoretical discussion does not deal with this strategy.) This subgame has n asymmetric Pure Nash equilibria in which a single consumer buys a song. Each of these Nash equilibria is Pareto-optimal, but yield asymmetric payoffs: the consumer who buys the song gets α b − 1 and the n − 1 consumers get α d . There is also an symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies that yield the same payoff to all players. In the symmetric equilibrium, all consumers buy with probability p, so the probability of getting at least one purchase decision from the n − 1 consumers equals to 1 − (1 − p) n−1 . The expected payoff from not buying a song is equal to
Equating the expected payoff from not buying to the expected payoff from buying, i.e., α b − 1, the probability of pirating at decision node M is given by:
The same procedure is repeated backwards until the first decision consumers make in which they are confronted with no new songs available for download. Recall that consumers start playing with an initial endowment of songs. Therefore, at the first decision point, there are (n − 1)b songs that can be downloaded. Given that pirating yields a higher net payoff than buying, the probability of pirating equals 1 for the first (n − 1)b decisions. For the first (n − 1)b decisions our games is basically a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) yielding the same standard prediction of complete free-riding. 7 For any consumer i taking a decision at point m i , the probability of pirating is given by:
In the experiment we consider n = 4 consumers, each with e = 8,b = 2, α b = 1.1, and α d = 0.5.
For the record label, we set S = 32 and α l = 0.1. For the parents, E = 12 and α p = 0.6. Given these parameters the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of our game is:
Given that we are interested in understanding how well advice can dissuade piracy, we intentionally chose parameters wherein the pirating probability is quite high in the Nash equilibrium.
Treatment Design and Hypotheses
The previous section presented the equilibrium analysis when there was no communication (advice) sent to the consumers. Our interest in the paper is to study the effects of the source of advice on pirating and purchasing behavior. To do so, as we will detail later, we conduct an experiment of the same game over multiple iterations. Subsequently, after every few iterations, advice is provided depending on the treatment and the outcomes which are to be analyzed. Section 4.1 details how the various treatments, i.e., the sources of advice, are different. Following that, Section 4.2 provides the hypotheses regarding the implications.
Experimental Treatments
We consider four experimental treatments which differ in the source of advice. Within each source of advice our treatments vary along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a social tie exists between the advisor and advisee. The second dimension is whether the source of advice has a stake in the outcome of the consumers' purchasing and pirating decisions. Table 1 represents the four treatments in a 2 × 2 matrix. We expand below on how the dimensions are varied in each of the treatments, and how the treatments reflect the educational approach pursued by stakeholders in digital goods industries. 
We first consider the presence of a social tie between the advisor and the advisee. An appropriate representation of the social tie dimension in our piracy context are the parents of the music consumers. Parents are often targeted as the source of advice when using an educational approach to combat piracy (Purvis, 2005; RIAA, 2009) . Also, parents are in a position of authority and control over their teens, and the teens' perception of advice represents this relationship (Hunter, 1984 (Hunter, , 1985 . We consider two treatment variants involving the parents to allow us to capture the possible reality of losses due to litigation, and therefore the stake in the game dimension. One variant where the parents incur no punishment because of their children's (consumers') actions, and another variant where the parents incur a punishment.
In contrast, we also consider advice coming from a record label or an industry regulator. Both sources again allow us to represent the educational approach to combating piracy when there is no social tie with the consumer, while varying the stake in the game dimension. The record label has a stake in the game, i.e., the pirating / purchasing decision impacts its profits, and is motivated from news articles involving recording artists advising against piracy (for example, Metallica (Jones, 2000) ). However, the regulator does not have a direct and immediate stake in the game. When an action is taken by a regulator that generates attention about piracy, it may be construed as advice. For example, the SOPA and PIPA legislative proposals from the U.S. Congress brought to prominence the negative impact of piracy (Wortham, 2012) . Another example is Smith and Benoit (2010) .
Hypotheses
Note that even when the advisors have a direct stake in the game, their incentive is never aligned with that of the consumers (i.e., receivers). So, borrowing insights from the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) , we expect rational and selfish consumers to treat the advice as cheap talk. Consequently, we expect no difference in consumer decisions because of the source of advice. The standard predictions from Section 3 become applicable independent of the treatments.
Formally,
Hypothesis 1: According to standard Nash equilibrium predictions, the source of advice will make no difference in the number of songs pirated and purchased, and the probability of pirating. The level of purchasing and pirating should be the same in all four treatments.
Next, we deviate from the assumption that subjects are solely motivated to maximize their own earnings, but retain the assumption that the advice is "cheap talk." First, assume that subjects have outcome-oriented social preferences, i.e., they care for the earnings of the other subjects. This is consistent with the theoretical models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) as well as experimental evidence from Croson (2007) and Fehr and Gächter (2000) . In that case, music consumers would care for the earnings of other subjects with a stake in the game and would adjust their behavior accordingly. Therefore, we should observe lower levels of piracy and consequently more purchases, than that predicted by standard theory. Moreover, in the presence of outcome-oriented social preferences, the level of piracy in the treatment "parent with punishment"
should be the lowest one as compared to the other treatments given that both the firm and the parent have a stake in the game. The following hypothesis formalizes the prediction in case subjects are motivated by outcome-oriented social preferences. 8
Hypothesis 2: According to outcome-oriented social preferences, the source of advice will not make a difference in the number of songs pirated and purchased, and the probability of pirating. The level of piracy should be lower in PP as compared to the other three treatments. The level of piracy should be the same in treatments PNP, RL, and REG.
Next, assume that the social context matters as well. Specifically, individuals may be concerned about what others think about them. In this social esteem model, subjects feel proud if others think highly of them and shameful otherwise. Also, subjects may feel guilty and experience a utility loss if they believe they let others down. Therefore, guilt-averse subjects are motivated to meet the expectations of others, even at the expense of their own earnings. These behaviors have been theoretically presented in the literature, for example, in Dufwenberg (2009, 2007) as well as shown experimentally in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) , and Ellingsen et al. (2012) .
Shame and guilt feelings can be strengthened by the existence of advice. On one hand, music consumers know that advisors are informed, from time to time, about the consumers' behavior.
On the other hand, the advice can make the expectations more salient about a certain behavior to follow. In particular, purchasing and pirating levels may depend on what the music buyer believes that the advisor expects to happen, and how bad the music buyer may feel for not meeting the advisors' expectations. According to a model of social esteem and guilt-aversion, the advice makes others' expectations salient and as such may not be considered cheap talk, therefore affecting pirating and purchasing decisions.
The feelings of shame and guilt are very likely to depend on with whom subjects interact.
More specifically, not only may the advice impact behavior, but the source of advice may affect the intensity of that behavior. Regarding the source of advice, our experiment focuses on two dimensions: stakes and social ties. Consider first the social ties. As social ties are often formed unconsciously through social interactions (Coleman, 1994) , the social tie with a parent is expected to be stronger than a social tie with a record label or with the experimenter. Moreover, social psychologists have claimed that the attitudes toward entities for which there is a social tie are more favored by individuals over those for which there is not a social tie (Eagly and Chaiken, 1998) . Consequently, letting parents' expectations down by not following their advice may cause subjects to feel more guilty and/or ashamed as compared to not meeting either the record label's or the experimenter's expectations by not following their advice. The aforementioned argument is formalized next:
Hypothesis 3: The existence of a social tie between the advisor and the advisee matters.
The number of songs pirated (purchased) should be lower (higher) because of the social tie. The level of piracy should be lower in the parents' treatments as compared to the other two treatments.
Next consider whether the advisor has a stake in the game. Even if subjects follow advice in order to meet the expectations of the advisor, the effect of advice is likely to be stronger if the advisor has a stake in the game. Therefore, in our game, we expect the advice from the record label to lead to more purchasing and less pirating. In a similar vein, the advice from the parents with stakes in the game should lead to more purchasing and less pirating also.
Hypothesis 4: Having a stake in the game matters. Advice will reduce pirating and increase purchasing when the advisor has a stake in the game.
Finally, we consider the interaction between the two possible characteristics of the advisor:
having a stake in the outcome and the existence of the social tie. As stated earlier, if the social tie exists, the reception of the advice should be favorable. Also, if the advisor has a stake in the game, the advice is more likely to be followed and this likelihood is higher with the existence of social ties between the advisor and the advisee.
Hypothesis 5: The decrease (increase) in pirating (purchasing) behavior because of the increased stake of the advisor will increase with the existence of the social tie.
To summarize, advice is merely "cheap talk" when subjects have selfish preferences and strictly outcome-oriented social preferences. Even though the level of piracy is expected to be lower in the case of outcome-oriented social preferences as compared to selfish ones, neither the advice nor its source accounts for the behavior. In the case where subjects are concerned about what others think and expect, or having shame or guilt for letting others down, advice is then not considered as cheap talk and may influence behavior. In that case, the characteristics of the advisor may also play a role in how advice is taken into consideration.
Experiment Implementation
Experiments were conducted such that each subject was allowed to participate in only one session.
Every participant was assigned to the same group for the entire session, and each session involved at least 2 groups. Consistent with the game setup, four music consumers (n = 4) and one music label were part of one group. In treatments where parents provided the advice, the corresponding parent or guardian was assigned to the same group. The groups were created such that, other than their own parent (or guardian), subjects did not know the identity of their group members. We did so to minimize the reputation effects. In each session, only one experimental treatment was considered, and each session involved 20 rounds of the Piracy Game being played. Table 2 provides the details about the experimental parameters. In each round, every music consumer is endowed with e = 8 tokens andb = 2 songs. The music consumer earns α d = 0.5 tokens for each song pirated. If the music consumer instead chooses to purchase a song from the record label, 1 token is spent for the song, earning α b = 1.1 tokens. The net gain to the music consumer is therefore (α b − 1) = 0.1 tokens per purchased song. We normalize the u(b) to be zero in our The record label is endowed with S = 32 songs, earns 1 token for each song sold, and also receives α l = 0.1 tokens per unsold song left in their inventory each round. The endowment was set to 32 because it is the maximum the record label will sell given that 4 music consumers exist in a group, each with 8 tokens at the beginning of each round.
In the treatments involving parents, they receive an endowment of E = 12 tokens. If a music consumer pirates, the corresponding parent incurs a loss of α p = 0.6 tokens per pirated song in the 'Parents With Punishment' treatment.
For each session, we may not be able to finish conducting the desired number of rounds without a time limit since subjects may simply wait for their peers to purchase songs before they take any action. To avoid such scenarios, subjects are given T = 25 seconds within each round to make as many purchase / pirate / do nothing decisions they would like to make. We decided on this limit after several pilot sessions. We also based it on the Parent With Punishment treatment because we do not want to allow the potential earnings for parents to go negative (i.e., 12 − 0.6 * 20 = 0).
The aforementioned steps are repeated for each of the 20 rounds. Twice during the 20 rounds of play, we facilitate communication to the consumers and the source depends on the treatment.
The source of advice for each treatment was always made known to all subjects prior to starting the experiment. They did not know ex ante when they would receive advice, only that they would at some point receive advice from their parent, the record label, or the experiment administrator (taking the role of the regulator). The advice is given for the first time after the 8 th round, and after the 14 th round for the second time. This design allows us to separate the rounds into three blocks. The first block includes 8 rounds where no advice is provided and two other blocks each of 6 rounds of length after the advice is provided.
If the treatment designates the advice to be given by the record label or experiment administrator, the advice is sent via the computer screen. If the treatment involved advice from the consumer's parent, the advice is handwritten on paper by the parent, then handed to the consumer by the experiment administrator. Although handwriting the parent's advice creates additional time spent and organizational challenges, using this approach reinforces the belief in the consumers that the advice is truthfully from the parent, a critical feature of our design. We do not believe that the difference in the medium of communication (via paper versus via computer screen) creates any difference in the outcomes. Prior experimental literature and, in particular, the public-goods-games related ones has considered the impact of the medium of communication on coordination but did not find a difference on average between various types of non-verbal communication (e.g., Brosig et al., 2003) . Regardless of the source of advice, the wording and content of the advice was similar across all sources. Whenever the advice was delivered, it always contained information about the record label's earnings and average amount of piracy occurring among the group members. At the start of round 9, only that information is provided as advice. At the start of round 15, the advice that consumers received also included the moral opinion of the source (i.e., parent, record label, regulator) about piracy -specifically, "morally acceptable," "morally wrong," "strongly believe it is morally wrong."
We conducted the experiment in the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory at Purdue University during the summer and fall of 2011-2012. 9 In treatments involving parents, subjects were recruited by visiting new student orientation sessions having both parents and students, making a verbal announcement to the audience, and asking for voluntary participation. In other treatments, subjects were recruited by email using the laboratory's online recruitment system.
Regardless of recruitment method, subject participation was limited to a single session.
A total of 123 subjects participated in our experimental sessions (PNP : 20 music consumers,
The lab is constructed with partitioned desks for each subject, and has 28 computers with flat-panel displays, plus one administrator server computer. There is an observation room with one-way glass adjacent to the laboratory and is used to monitor subject behavior throughout the experiment. 20 parents, 5 record labels; PP : 8 music consumers, 8 parents, 2 record labels; REG: 24 music consumers, 6 record labels; RL: 24 music consumers, 6 record labels). The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree v.3.3.6 software package (Fischbacher, 2007) . Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to individual computers and communication between subjects was not allowed during the session. Experiment instructions were provided to each subject and were read aloud by the experiment administrator. A copy of the instructions is available in Appendix A. We randomly chose three of the twenty periods for payment, and paid each subject their total profit over these periods at conversion rate of 0.8 tokens per US dollar. Using this approach avoids wealth effects because the earnings from each round are valued independently of each other, reducing the ability for wealth to encourage manipulation of later rounds. The experiment lasted on average 1 hour and subjects were compensated $12.05 on average. We concluded each session with a short demographic questionnaire, and all subjects were paid in cash privately and individually.
Experimental Results
This section presents the experimental data and tests for our hypotheses. Following the order of our previous sections, Section 6.1 compares piracy decisions to the theoretical prediction of our game. Next, Section 6.2 analyzes the aggregate results of pirating and purchasing behavior across treatments. Finally, the short and long-term effects of advice are discussed in Section 6.3.
We note the following two remarks: First, for the analysis, we use only non-parametric tests to compare treatments. The use of relatively simple statistics are common in experimental economics studies, including those in leading economic outlets (see e.g., Andersen et al., 2011; Kosfeld et al., 2009 ). Such a simple approach is sufficient because experiments -particularly those conducted in the lab -carefully control for possible confounding effects by having a random assignment of participants. Second, and unless explicitly stated otherwise, we omit the first eight rounds of the game from the analysis. We do so to focus on treatment differences after the advice is given, and to allow subjects to learn the technology used to conduct the experiment. Therefore, rounds 9-20 are analyzed in two blocks of six rounds each, i.e., 9-14, and 15-20, accounting for the provision of advice at the beginning of the 9 th and 15 th rounds. shown at the top of the figure. In the predicted line, the 7 th decision represents the point during the round where there are no additional songs left to pirate. Therefore, the equilibrium prediction equals to 100% of piracy until click 7, and 92.83% from click 7 onwards. Each treatment is plotted as well.
Clickstream Data and Nash Equilibrium
We observe consumers in all treatments pirating below the equilibrium level. In particular, the PP treatment begins at a much lower percentage of piracy in comparison with the others. Over time the consumers in this treatment begin to pirate more, eventually approaching the levels of piracy of other treatments. Despite the piracy levels being below the Nash predictions, there is a similar trend in decision-making at the 7 th decision in the clickstream. In particular, we observe the consumers slightly reducing their pirating at that time, followed by an oscillating cycle of increasing and decreasing piracy.
The clickstream analysis shows that consumers do not fully behave as standard theory predicts, giving a first indication that hypothesis 1 does not hold. there is an increasing trend in pirating behavior until round 9, where the behavior in each of the treatments levels off and, in some circumstances, begins to oscillate up and down. In contrast, purchasing behavior tends to be relatively flat across all the rounds in all the treatments.
Pirating and Purchasing Behavior Across Treatments
Second, consumers seem to respond to advice by decreasing their pirating behavior for a short while, which is shown by the dip in average number of pirated songs after rounds 8 and 14. Two exceptions are however observed. A few rounds after receiving the advice, consumers seem to disregard the advice in the Regulator treatment, as shown by the large increases in downloading after round 9. Also, the downloading increases slightly for the Record Label treatment in round 15 compared to round 14. Regarding purchasing behavior, there is a slight increase after advice in all of the treatments. In particular, the Parent -No Punishment treatment shows a large increase in purchasing after the last round of advice. The effect of advice is further discussed in Section 6.3.
Finally, there are some differences across treatments in the number of songs pirated and purchased. In particular, the number of pirated songs is lower and the number of purchased songs is higher in the Parent -Punishment treatment as compared to the other treatments. Next, we explore in more detail the differences in pirating and purchasing behavior across treatments at an aggregate level, investigating whether social ties and/or having a stake in the game can possibly explain differences across treatments. Standard deviations in parentheses. Table 3 presents aggregate results for the last two blocks of rounds, each after the provision of advice. As can be seen, the PP treatment shows less pirating and more purchasing in comparison to the other treatments. Consumers, therefore, appear to internalize the penalty suffered by parents, restricting their piracy behavior and purchasing more often, even if this reduces their own earnings. All of the pairwise comparisons between the PP treatment and every other treatment are significantly different for both purchasing and pirating levels using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum U test for rounds 9-14, with the exception of the comparisons with PNP and RL for pirating in rounds 15-20. 10 These results indicate that subjects are not fully selfish and seem to care about the outcome of others. In particular they care for the outcome of their parents. This, in part, validates hypothesis 2.
However, consumers do not seem to be motivated solely by outcome-oriented preferences, otherwise we should observe no significant differences across the other three treatments. Indeed, this is not the case as we can see next.
First, results from the REG treatment show a statistically significant and higher level of piracy than the one observed in all the other treatments for both rounds 9-14 and rounds 15-20. 11 Second, there are statistically significant differences between the PNP treatment and the RL treatment for purchases in the two blocks of rounds. 12 . Finally, and the most striking result, the RL treatment shows the worst average profit outcome in comparison to the others. The result highlights the risk of a digital goods producer engaging in anti-piracy messaging. The main reason behind this result is that fewer songs are being purchased in comparison with other treatments.
All of the differences across treatments seem to indicate that, besides having potential outcomeoriented social preferences, consumers seem to care about the social context around them. More specifically, and as stated in Section 4.2, consumers may feel shame or guilt for not fulfilling others'
expectations. Moreover, given that consumers knew from the beginning of the experiment that a message would be received, they might have acted in order not to let their advisor down. If that is the case, and as discussed in Section 4.2, social ties and having a stake in the game are two mechanisms that can potentially explain the differences we found across treatments. Next, we consider the impact of social ties on purchasing and pirating behavior.
The Role of Social Ties
Recall that our hypothesis 3 states that the existence of a social tie will result in less pirating and greater purchasing by the consumer. Table 4 provides results aggregated along the dimension of social ties, grouped by each block of rounds. We can clearly see a pattern where the existence of a social tie results in greater purchases, less piracy, and greater profit for the record label. The noted patterns in the results are confirmed to be statistically significant between treatments using Mann-Whitney rank-sum U tests. 13 Overall, we find support for hypothesis 3.
11 The Mann-Whitney rank-sum U tests are: Rounds 9-14, comparison of purchases: PP vs. REG, z = 3.86, p < 0.01; PNP vs. REG, z = 1.53, p = 0.13; RL vs. REG, z = −0.19, p = 0.85. Rounds 9-14, comparison of pirating: PP vs. REG, z = −3.67, p < 0.01; PNP vs. REG, z = −3.68, p < 0.01; RL vs. REG, z = −5.34, p < 0.01. Recall that our hypothesis 4 states that having a stake in the game will result in less pirating and greater purchasing by the consumer as compared to not having a stake at all. Table 5 aggregates results for those treatments with and without a stake in the outcome, organized by blocks of rounds.
We observe statistically significant differences between the grouped treatments for pirated songs only. The amount of purchased songs remains indistinguishable whether or not the advisor has a stake in the outcome. It appears that when a stake is involved, consumers are less willing to harm the utility of others when it comes to pirating songs. At the same time, consumers are not more willing to hurt their own utility by purchasing songs in excess of when a source of advice does not have a stake in the outcome. As before, the results are confirmed to be statistically significant between treatments using Mann-Whitney rank-sum U tests. 14 Thus we find partial support of hypothesis 4 for pirating but not for purchasing. Consequently, from the record label's standpoint, the profits are also the same.
6.2.3 The Interaction of Social Ties and Stake: Difference-in-Difference Measure Another interesting analysis is how the stake of the advisor plays out with and without social ties. Therefore, we compute the difference of the average purchases/downloads between the PP and PNP treatments, giving us a measure of the impact of having a stake in the outcome when there is a social tie. Similarly, we compute the difference of the average purchases/downloads between the RL and REG treatments, giving us a difference measure of the averages of the stake in the outcome when there is no social tie. Then, we take the difference of the differences. Results are aggregated to rounds 9-20 and presented in Table 6 . In the case of purchases, the difference-in-difference measure results in a test statistic of t = 4.25, which is statistically significant at p < 0.01. In the case of pirating songs, the difference-in-difference measure results in a test statistic of t = 0.87, which is not statistically significant. Our result provides partial support for hypothesis 5.
The Short-term and Lasting Effects of Advice
Next we look at the longevity of the effect of advice. PP is an exception because the subjects have already accounted for their guilt-averse preferences without needing to receive advice. In contrast, there are no observable lasting effects (see rounds 7-8 versus 9-12 and rounds 13-14 versus 15-18) from the advice in any of the treatments. 17 Not surprisingly, the advice in the REG treatment never has an immediate or lasting effect on advice, and is perceived simply as "cheap talk" by the subjects. Results from two-sample t-tests shown in parentheses.
Differences are computed as before advice minus after advice.
Summary of Results
Overall, our results provide many interesting insights into the relationship between advisors and advisees when it comes to using advice to influence purchasing and pirating behavior. Across all of our analyses, it is broadly clear that having a social tie has a strong influence on purchasing behavior, but less so on influencing pirating behavior. With regard to the stake in the game, it as the comparison of rounds 13-14 with 15-18. 16 Our conclusions regarding the immediate effects of advice are also supported without change in sign or statistical significance using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. We provide t-statistics throughout Table 7 for consistency because we have unequal sample sizes in our tests for lasting effects.
17 RL is marginally significant in increasing purchasing (p < 0.10) in the third block of rounds.
is critically important for the adviser to have both a stake in the game and a social tie with the advisee, illustrated by the Parent -Punishment treatment. The relationship between an increasing stake and increasing social tie to the consumer is also critical, otherwise the advice is viewed as "cheap talk" and completely disregarded. Ultimately, the PP treatment is the most effective at both decreasing pirating as well as increasing purchasing among all of the treatments.
Discussion and Conclusion
Digital piracy is an important issue drawing significant attention from both policy makers and digital goods manufacturers. Digital goods providers have been pursuing various approaches to educate potential pirates about the implications of piracy to nudge them towards purchasing.
Yet, there appears to be little formal analysis done on the implication of the various educational strategies. With the aim of filling this gap, our paper investigates the implications of the source of advice on pirating as well as purchasing decisions. We are unaware of any prior work that has considered this problem.
There are some unique aspects to our experimental design and implementation. As implied earlier, our Piracy Game is one of the first to explicitly account for the distinction between the pirating and purchasing decisions. Our design also allows us to also conduct clickstream analysis, another aspect not common in many behavioral economics studies. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to include both parents and their children as subjects in a behavioral/experimental economics study. We believe that these are contributions not only to the IS area because of the context but also to the behavioral economics literature.
Using this experimental setup, we consider four different treatments that differ in terms of the source of advice. These treatments vary along two dimensions -one is whether the source of advice has a social tie with the subjects and the other is whether the advisor has a stake in the outcome of the game. Specifically, in the four treatments we consider, advice comes from: (a) parents incurring a penalty for their respective teens' piracy decisions; (b) parents without any penalty for their teens' actions; (c) the private provisioner of the public good (i.e., record label); and (d) a third party regulator not directly affected because of piracy/purchase decisions.
Our experimental data identified several insights, of which some are as follows. When there is a tangible stake for the parent for their teens' actions, purchasing behavior by the teen is significantly increased, and pirating behavior is slightly decreased. Even when there is not a stake for the parents (e.g., potential litigation), the advice is most effective when the advisor has a social tie (parent as opposed to the record label or a regulator). These results indicate that regulators and record labels should perhaps enhance their focus on education channels through advisors with a social tie to the pirates, by reaching out to parents, guardians, and other close or important sources of advice to the teens.
On the contrary, when the record label provides advice, the profit generated surprisingly results in the worst outcome. This result represents the finding that music consumers are undeterred by the direct complaints from the music industry and -for better or for worse -it appears our results may in fact capture populist sentiment (e.g., negative sentiments towards Metallica and their stance on piracy Jones, 2000) . Although the industry is attempting to shift to education strategies (e.g., Pyyny, 2003; RIAA, 2009 RIAA, , 2011a Stewart-Robertson, 2010) , in lieu of litigation (or technology controls for that matter), the current status quo of sending advice directly from third parties could certainly be improved by coordinating advice through channels with social ties to the pirates. On a related note, we believe that the qualitative nature of the results should extend to other forms of social ties (e.g., friends, teachers) as well, although the results may be quantitatively different.
While we believe that our paper provides actionable insights, it is not without limitations. In order to be parsimonious in terms of design in a lab setting, we assumed consumers made purchased music automatically available for others to pirate. Nevertheless, relaxing that assumption is an important future research question that is worth considering, both from an experimental as well as a practical standpoint. Further, in this study, we only analyzed the existence of a social tie but not the degree. Varying the quality of the social tie between subjects may be worth considering and could be explored as a future study to develop additional insights. Also, a future study might pursue this topic using field experiments.
A Experiment Instructions
General Guidelines:
Thank you for participating in this economic experiment. You will be paid in cash for your participation, and the amount of money you earn depends on the decisions that you and other participants make in individual rounds. Your final payment will be determined by three random draws done by the computer at the conclusion of the experiment. Each draw will correspond to one round of the experimental session. The average earnings over these three randomly selected rounds will be used to calculate your final payment. All earnings in this experiment will be presented to you in tokens and converted to US dollars at the conclusion of the experiment. The conversion rate, which is identical for everyone, is: 1 token per 0.8 US dollar.
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.
You are welcome to ask questions at any time by raising your hand. Please wait for an experimenter to come to your seat before asking your question. While the experiment is in progress, please do not speak or in any other way communicate with other participants. This is important to the validity of the study.
Specific Guidelines:
In this experiment, you are taking part in a study about the decisions to purchase and download music. In the game, there are three types of participants: Record labels, music consumers, and non-consumers. The roles are fixed for the entire experiment and assigned in the following manner:
University senior students will play the role of record labels; new students will be assigned the role of consumers; and parents will be given the role of non-consumers.
In this experiment you are a music buyer
In the experiment, you are going to play a game in a group of 9 participants. Each group will consist of 1 senior University student (a record label), 4 new students (the music consumers), and their respective parents (non-consumers). Groups are randomly formed in the beginning of the experiment and remain fixed for the entire experiment. Apart from your family member, you will never know the identities of the other participants in your group.
You will play a total of 20 rounds. Each round lasts 25 seconds. In each round, the player's decisions and earnings are as follows:
Record Label:
The record label does not make any decisions for the entire experiment. In the beginning of each round, the record label has 32 songs to sell. The record label gets 1 token for each song that is sold and 0.1 tokens for each unsold song.
Record Label's earnings in each round = 1 * number of songs sold in the round + 0.1 * number of songs not sold in the round Music Buyers:
In this experiment you are a music buyer. In the beginning of each round, every music-buyer will receive an identical allowance of 8 tokens and 2 songs. Each round spans 25 seconds, within which you and every music buyer in your group will make a series of decisions. During each round please make as many decisions as possible. Specifically, your decision involves choosing one of the following options:
1. buy 1 song from the record label (if you have any tokens available) 2. download 1 song for free from the Internet (if there are new songs available)
do nothing
If you decide to buy a song from the record label, it costs you 1 token. Purchasing a song earns you 1.1 tokens.
The Internet source will have all the songs that you and other music buyers own, including those purchased. You can download a song from the Internet source so long as you do not own it. Because of the initial allowance of 2 songs, there are 6 other songs from the Internet source available for download at the beginning. As other music-buyers purchase songs, the number of songs available for download increases. Downloading a song from the Internet costs you nothing and earns you 0.5 tokens.
If you decide to do nothing you have no costs or earnings.
Remember that you will never be informed about the decisions of any other music-buyer in your group. Your earnings in each round will depend on the number of songs you initially owned, bought from the record label, and downloaded from the Internet source, plus the tokens you retained without purchasing.
Your earnings in each round = 8 -1 * number of songs you bought in the round + 1.1 * number of songs you bought in the rounds + 0.5 * number of songs you downloaded in the round
At the end of each round, you will be informed about your own earnings for that round.
Non-consumers (parents):
Parents will get an allowance of 12 tokens per round. Your parent will never be informed about the choices you made in the experiment. However, at times parents are informed about the average number of songs downloaded from the Internet by your group and your parent will send you a message regarding the experiment.
